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usual presumption of due care on the part of the deceased in a wrongful death action
apparently does not exist.'7 Thus, it would seem that the eyewitness rule should not
bar habit evidence where the sole eyewitness is interested adversely to the plaintiff.
Family Relations-InterVivos Transfers-Protection of Spouse's Statutory Share
-[New York].-Three days before his death, the husband transferred all his real and
personal property in trust, reserving income for life, power of revocation, and control
of the trustees as to the adninistration of the trust. The trial court refused to enforce
the trust as against the widow's claim for her statutory share in her husband's estate.,
On appeal, held, affirmed. The husband's transfer was "illusory" in respect to the
widow's marital rights. Newman v. Dore.2
In place of common law dower and curtesy, many states have substituted legislation which gives the surviving spouse, even against a will, a percentage of the decedent's personal and real property remaining in the estate at the time of his or her
death.3 While the general policy motivating these statutes was to protect the spouse
against disinheritance, the effectiveness of such statutes largely depends upon the
extent to which either spouse is permitted to alienate his or her property during life.
The statutes are generally silent on the problem of inter vivos transfers; and in order to
give effect to the policy behind these statutes the courts have sometimes been compelled to nullify transfers made during coverture.
Such relief has been predicated upon two distinct grounds: (i) the subjective intent
primarily to defeat the marital rights of the surviving spouse rather than to benefit
the person to whom the property is given; or (2) the failure of the transferor to relinquish in part or in whole the incidents of ownership. Under the first theory, followed
in a minority of jurisdictions, the main problem turns upon evidence of the transferor's
intent.4 Where definite evidence is lacking, the protection afforded the surviving
spouse depends upon the presumptions invoked by the court. Thus, in Murray v.
Murrays the court held that a presumption of an intent to defeat the widow's share
arose where the gift constituted a principal part of the husband's estate. In Vermont,
contrary to earlier decisions, 6 no presumptions are raised from the fact that the natural
'7 Contrast the refusal of the trial court to grant an instruction in accord with this presump273, 8 N.E. (2d) 620 (i937), with
tion, as indicated by the record in Blumb v. Getz, 366 Ill.
Anderson v. C.R.I. &P. Ry. Co. i8g Iowa 739, 175 N.W. 583 (1920); Gembolis v. Rydeski, 258
Mich. 521, 243 N.W. 44 (1932); 6 Iowa L. Bull. 55 (1920); Cf. 44 Harv. L. Rev. 292 (1930).
Cahill's Cons1. Laws N.Y. 1930, c. 13, §§ i8, 83.
2 275 N.Y.371, 9 N.E.(2d)9 66 (i937); noted 37 Col. L. Rev. 1219 (1937), 7 Brooklyn L.

Rev. 241 (7937).

33 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ i88, 189 (i935). These statutes establish a "legitime
portion" for the surviving spouse, analogous to that of the Civil Law. See note 24 infra.
4 Evans v. Evans, 78 N.H. 352, oo At. 671 (,9,7); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, i8
AUt. 153 (i889); Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); see notes 5-7 infra.
s9o Ky. i, 13 S.W. 244 (i8go); see also Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W. (2d) 2
(1930).
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Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 Ad. 153 (1889)

(mere gratuitous transfer is presumptively fraudulent).

RECENT CASES
consequence of a transfer is to reduce the size of the estate and ultimately the statutory
share of the surviving spouse. Such intent must be proved "beyond a reasonable
doubt,"'7 by a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the transfer. While the
court does not specify what would constitute sufficient proof of such intent, it is probable that it would consider as relevant the time intervening between the transfer and
the death of the transferor and the nature of the provisions made for the survivor.
Most courts have disregarded the intent theory,8 and have focused their attention
on the character of the transfer. Thus the courts uphold a transfer against the surviving spouse if it is a completed gift inter vivos;9 while they protect the surviving
spouse against gifts causa mortis," or against a pretended transfer which is actually a
mere sham."' The survivor, however, was denied a distributive share in cases where
the decedent reserved a life estate under an irrevocable trust.

2

Some courts have,

against the claim of surviving spouse, upheld a trust arrangement which allowed the
transferor the right of changing the beneficiaries.2 In Pennsylvania"4 the courts have
even sustained trusts, reserving a life estate and a power of revocation, against the
marital claims of the survivor.'s
In New York, the lower courts have given liberal interpretation to a statute de7 Dunnett

v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419,
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AUt. 919 (1933).

8 Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. io68 (1902); Poole v. Poole, 129 Md. 387, 99
At. 487 (igi6); Holmes v. Holmes, 3 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 363 (1832); Padfield v. Padfield, 78
Ill. x6 (1875); Hall v. Hall, iog Va. 1i7, 63 S.E. 420 (igog); Norris v. Bradshaw, 96 Colo. 594,
45 P. (2d) 638 (i935); Sederlund v. Sederlund, 176 Wis. 627, 187 N.W. 750
Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Ad. 8og (i891).
9 Potter Title and Trust Co. v. Braum,
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55 Ind. App. 40, ioo N.E. io49 (I913); see also Harmon v. Harmon, 131 Ark. 5oi, xgg S.W.
553 (i917); contra: Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray (Mass.) 418 (i859).

"1Smith v. Smith, 22 Colo. 480, 46 Pac. 128 (i898); Doane v. Doane, 238 Mass. io6, 130
N.E. 484 (I92i); Hays v. Henry, i Md. Ch. 337 (1848).
12 Patterson v. McClenathan, 296 IM.475, 129 N.E. 767 (1921); Hall v. Hall, iog Va. 117,
63 S.E. 420 (igog; Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 311, 40 So. 1o4 (i9o6); In re Side's
Estate, 1i9 Neb. 314, 228 N.W. 6ig (i93o).
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'3 Kelly v. Snow, I85 Mass. 288, 7 N.E. 89 (i9o4); Roche v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 150
519, 139 N.E. 912
N.E. 866 (1926); Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Patterson, 308 Ill.
App. 57, 86 (1928) (allowed beneficiary to be
(1923); Boyle v. John M. Smythe Co., 248 Ill.

designated in will).
'4 The language in some of the earlier Pennsylvania decisions, while confusing, suggests
that the courts have followed the intent theory. Ross's Appeal, 127 Pa. 4, 17 Ad. 682 (1889);
Dickerson's Appeal, i5 Pa. i98, 8 Ad. 64 (1886). The later decisions have discarded this
theory. See note 15 infra.
ISLines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Ad. 809 (i8gi); Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa.
349, 91 At. 634 (I914); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, i6i AU. 721
(1932); see also Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. 316 (1824). Cf. Cameron v. Cameron, 18 Miss,
394 (848).
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signed "to increase the share of a surviving spouse.' ' 6 Thus, in Ruin v. Myrub
Realty Co." the court held that an antenuptial conveyance made with intent to deprive the widow of her share was void as against the wife's marital rights; and in
Bodner v. Feit18 the court, in setting aside a transfer by the husband, considered such
an intent as one of the operative facts. The Court of Appeals, however, though protecting the widow in the instant case, rejects this fabric of protection afforded the surviving spouse by the intent theory, and apparently aligns itself with the majority rule
that only the degree of control retained by the transferor will be considered.x9 This
position of the court is not only likely to nullify the purpose of the statute, but is also
inconsistent; for in eschewing the intent theory it could not logically, following the
control theory, brand as "illusory" a conveyance which it assumes to be otherwise
valid.
In order to reach the desired result, the court might have, contrary to Van Cott v.
Prentice,"° followed the suggestion of the Restatement and declared the trust testamentary and therefore invalid." Preferably, it might have, consistent with the earlier
decisions in the lower courts,' 2 set aside the transfer upon the finding in the trial court
that the trust was established with intent to defeat the widow's share. The courts' reluctance to follow the intent theory can be explained only in that it might result in
too great a restraint on alienation.3 While such a criticism was perhaps applicable to
dower, which placed a restriction on commercial transactions, it has no application to
gratuitous transfers. Therefore, even apart from legislation that might be passed4 to
protect the distributive share against inter vivos transfers, it is suggested that in construing the present statutes the policy of solicitude for the surviving spouse should be
paramount.
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17244 App. Div. 541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (1935); see also Le Strange v. Le Strange, 242 App.
Div. 74, 273 N.Y. Supp. 21 (1934).
Z8247 App. Div. Ig, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1936); noted 46 Yale L. J. 884 (1937), 37 Col.

L. Rev. 317 (1937). The courts have held, however, that the widow has no claim against a
"Totten trust," where there is a bank deposit, revocable at will, by one person as trustee for
another. In re Clark, 149 Misc. 371, 268 N.Y. Supp. 253 (1933); In re Schurer's Estate, 157
Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28 (1935), aff'd 248 App. Div. 697, 289 N.Y. Supp. 818 (1936).

19It is interesting to note that in the instant case, Finch, J., concurred only in the result.
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" Rest., Trusts § 57(2) (1935); In re Tunnell's Estate, 325 Pa. 554,
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-Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 514, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (1935); Bodner v.
Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1936).
3 Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 184, 94 At. 523 (1915); Calm, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 139, 151 (1936).
24 Cf. German Civil Code, §§ 2325-2331; French Civil Code, arts. 920-930. These European
statutes are entitled to consideration in this country, since they are based on long experience
with the "legitime," an indefeasible interest in the decedent's estate.
Statutes might be enacted, whereby the wife's marital rights remain undefeated if the
husband in his transfer reserves a power of revocation; or if the transfer is made in contemplation of death (with a presumption arising withp a stipulated period). See 46 Yale L.J. 884,
887, n. 19 (1937).

